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Romanian Skimmer Gang in Mexico Outed by KrebsOnSecurity Stole $1.2 Billion

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An exhaustive inquiry published today by a consortium of investigative journalists says a three-part series KrebsOnSecurity published in 2015 on a Romanian ATM skimming gang operating in Mexico’s top tourist destinations disrupted their highly profitable business, which raked in an estimated $1.2 billion and enjoyed the protection of top Mexican authorities.

The multimedia investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and several international journalism partners detailed the activities of the so-called Riviera Maya crime gang, allegedly a mafia-like group of Romanians who until very recently ran their own ATM company in Mexico called “Intacash” and installed sophisticated electronic card skimming devices inside at least 100 cash machines throughout Mexico.

According to the OCCRP, Riviera Maya’s skimming devices allowed thieves to clone the cards, which were used to withdraw funds from ATMs in other countries — often halfway around the world in places like India, Indonesia, and Taiwan.

Investigators say each skimmer captured on average 1,000 cards per month, siphoning about $200 from individual victim accounts. This allowed the crime gang to steal approximately $20 million monthly.

“The gang had little tricks,” OCCRP reporters recounted in their video documentary (above). “They would use the cards in different cities all over the globe and wait three months so banks would struggle to trace where the card had originally been cloned.”

In September 2015, I traveled to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula to find and document almost two dozen ATMs in the region that were compromised with Bluetooth-based skimming devices. Unlike most skimmers — which can be detected by looking for out-of-place components attached to the exterior of a compromised cash machine — these skimmers were hooked to the internal electronics of ATMs operated by Intacash’s competitors by authorized personnel who’d reportedly been bribed or coerced by the gang.

But because the skimmers were Bluetooth-based, allowing thieves periodically to collect stolen data just by strolling up to a compromised machine with a mobile device, I was able to detect which ATMs had been hacked using nothing more than a cheap smart phone.

One of the Bluetooth-enabled PIN pads pulled from a compromised ATM in Mexico. The two components on the left are legitimate parts of the machine. The fake PIN pad made to be slipped under the legit PIN pad on the machine, is the orange bit, top right. The Bluetooth and data storage chips are in the middle.

Several days of wandering around Mexico’s top tourist areas uncovered these sophisticated skimmers inside ATMs in Cancun, Cozumel, Playa del Carmen and Tulum, including a compromised ATM in the lobby of my hotel in Cancun. OCCRP investigators said the gang also had installed the same skimmers in ATMs at tourist hotspots on the western coast of Mexico, in Puerto Vallarta, Sayulita and Tijuana.

Part III of my 2015 investigation concluded that Intacash was likely behind the scheme. An ATM industry source told KrebsOnSecurity at the time that his technicians had been approached by ATM installers affiliated with Intacash, offering those technicians many times their monthly salaries if they would provide periodic access to the machines they maintained.

The alleged leader of the Riviera Maya organization and principal owner of Intacash, 43-year-old Florian “The Shark” Tudor, is a Romanian with permanent residence in Mexico. Tudor claims he’s an innocent, legitimate businessman who’s been harassed and robbed by Mexican authorities.

Last year, police in Mexico arrested Tudor for illegal weapons possession, and raided his various properties there in connection with an investigation into the 2018 murder of his former bodyguard, Constantin Sorinel Marcu.

According to prosecution documents, Marcu and The Shark spotted my reporting shortly after it was published in 2015, and discussed what to do next on a messaging app:

The Shark: Krebsonsecurity.com See this. See the video and everything. There are two episodes. They made a telenovela.

Marcu: I see. It’s bad.

The Shark: They destroyed us. That’s it. Fuck his mother. Close everything.

The intercepted communications indicate The Shark also wanted revenge on whoever was responsible for leaking information about their operations.

The Shark: Tell them that I am going to kill them.

Marcu: Okay, I can kill them. Any time, any hour.

The Shark: They are checking all the machines. Even at banks. They found over 20.

Marcu: Whaaaat?!? They found? Already??

Throughout my investigation, I couldn’t be sure whether Intacash’s shiny new ATMs — which positively blanketed tourist areas in and around Cancun — also were used to siphon customer card data. I did write about my suspicions that Intacash’s ATMs were up to no good when I found they frequently canceled transactions just after a PIN was entered, and typically failed to provide paper receipts for withdrawals made in U.S. dollars.

But citing some of the thousands of official documents obtained in their investigation, the OCCRP says investigators now believe Intacash installed the same or similar skimming devices in its own ATMs prior to deploying them — despite advertising them as equipped with the latest security features and fraudulent device inhibitors.

Tudor’s organization “had the access that gave The Shark’s crew huge opportunities for fraud,” the OCCRP reports. “And on the Internet, the number of complaints grew. Foreign tourists in Mexico fleeced” by Intacash’s ATMs.

Many of the compromised ATMs I located in my travels throughout Mexico were at hotels, and while Intacash’s ATMs could be found on many street locations in the region, it was rare to find them installed at hotels.

The confidential source with whom I drove from place to place at the time said Intacash avoided installing their machines at hotels — despite such locations being generally far more profitable — for one simple reason: If one’s card is cloned from a hotel ATM, the customer can easily complain to the hotel staff. With a street ATM, not so much.

The investigation by the OCCRP and its partners paints a vivid picture of a highly insular, often violent transnational organized crime ring that controlled at least 10 percent of the $2 billion annual global market for skimmed cards.

It also details how the group laundered their ill-gotten gains, and is alleged to have built a human smuggling ring that helped members of the crime gang cross into the U.S. and ply their skimming trade against ATMs in the United States. Finally, the series highlights how the Riviera Maya gang operated with impunity for several years by exploiting relationships with powerful anti-corruption officials in Mexico.

Tudor and many of his associates maintain their innocence and are still living as free men in Mexico, although Tudor is facing charges in Romania for his alleged involvement with organized crime, attempted murder and blackmail. Intacash is no longer operating in Mexico. In 2019, Intacash’s sponsoring bank in Mexico suspended the company’s contract to process ATM transactions.

For much more on this investigation, check out OCCRP’s multi-part series, How a Crew of Romanian Criminals Conquered the World of ATM Skimming.

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AndrewTerry
36 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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Bluetooth Vulnerability: BIAS

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This is new research on a Bluetooth vulnerability (called BIAS) that allows someone to impersonate a trusted device:

Abstract: Bluetooth (BR/EDR) is a pervasive technology for wireless communication used by billions of devices. The Bluetooth standard includes a legacy authentication procedure and a secure authentication procedure, allowing devices to authenticate to each other using a long term key. Those procedures are used during pairing and secure connection establishment to prevent impersonation attacks. In this paper, we show that the Bluetooth specification contains vulnerabilities enabling to perform impersonation attacks during secure connection establishment. Such vulnerabilities include the lack of mandatory mutual authentication, overly permissive role switching, and an authentication procedure downgrade. We describe each vulnerability in detail, and we exploit them to design, implement, and evaluate master and slave impersonation attacks on both the legacy authentication procedure and the secure authentication procedure. We refer to our attacks as Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS).

Our attacks are standard compliant, and are therefore effective against any standard compliant Bluetooth device regardless the Bluetooth version, the security mode (e.g., Secure Connections), the device manufacturer, and the implementation details. Our attacks are stealthy because the Bluetooth standard does not require to notify end users about the outcome of an authentication procedure, or the lack of mutual authentication. To confirm that the BIAS attacks are practical, we successfully conduct them against 31 Bluetooth devices (28 unique Bluetooth chips) from major hardware and software vendors, implementing all the major Bluetooth versions, including Apple, Qualcomm, Intel, Cypress, Broadcom, Samsung, and CSR.

News articles.

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AndrewTerry
45 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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Secure Access with a Time-Based Policy

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More employees are working remote than ever before, but the need for strong cyber security hasn’t changed. If anything, it’s more important, as personal devices, unsecured home WiFi networks, and untold apps and websites are being used by employees every day outside the purview of IT.  

Businesses need to apply flexible, yet granular controls that ensure only the right people are accessing the right company data at the right time. In other words, employees need easy access, while IT maintains tight control over the company’s most important resources. With LastPass Identity, contextual policies like time-based access allow admins to set custom rules that keep employees working efficiently while preventing unauthorized access.  

Why a time-based policy? 

Most employees will need access to work apps in a specific window of time. IT can anticipate when any given employee is expected to work, and therefore when they will need access to their apps. Employee access in that window should be considered “normal” and low risk.  

Similarly, IT can anticipate when any given employee should not be working. Attempted access to apps in off-hours can be flagged for higher security requirements (such as multi-factor authentication) or blocked entirely. 

With a time-based access policy in place, IT admins can therefore restrict access only to the right employees at the right time, reducing risk of a data breach. 

Using a time-based policy with LastPass 

Time-based policies with LastPass Identity allow IT to reduce threats without impeding employee access during normal business hours. The time-based access policy applies to single sign-on applications that have been assigned to employees by IT. 

“Normal”, of course, might look different for all employees across an organization. Time zones, individual employee work habits, and even specific apps can all impact the parameters of a policy. With LastPass, all of those factors can be taken into account when customizing a time-based policy for the best user experience. 

In a time when IT has less physical oversight over employee access and authentication, contextual policies such as the time-based access policies add additional flexibility and control to securing a remote workforce. Watch our video to learn more about the benefits of a time-based access policy with LastPass Identity. 

The post Secure Access with a Time-Based Policy appeared first on The LastPass Blog.

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AndrewTerry
49 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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Cryptic Rumblings Ahead of First 2020 Patch Tuesday

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Sources tell KrebsOnSecurity that Microsoft Corp. is slated to release a software update on Tuesday to fix an extraordinarily serious security vulnerability in a core cryptographic component present in all versions of Windows. Those sources say Microsoft has quietly shipped a patch for the bug to branches of the U.S. military and to other high-value customers/targets that manage key Internet infrastructure, and that those organizations have been asked to sign agreements preventing them from disclosing details of the flaw prior to Jan. 14, the first Patch Tuesday of 2020.

According to sources, the vulnerability in question resides in a Windows component known as crypt32.dll, a Windows module that Microsoft says handles “certificate and cryptographic messaging functions in the CryptoAPI.” The Microsoft CryptoAPI provides services that enables developers to secure Windows-based applications using cryptography, and includes functionality for encrypting and decrypting data using digital certificates.

A critical vulnerability in this Windows component could have wide-ranging security implications for a number of important Windows functions, including authentication on Windows desktops and servers, the protection of sensitive data handled by Microsoft’s Internet Explorer/Edge browsers, as well as a number of third-party applications and tools.

Equally concerning, a flaw in crypt32.dll might also be abused to spoof the digital signature tied to a specific piece of software. Such a weakness could be exploited by attackers to make malware appear to be a benign program that was produced and signed by a legitimate software company.

This component was introduced into Windows more than 20 years ago — back in Windows NT 4.0. Consequently, all versions of Windows are likely affected (including Windows XP, which is no longer being supported with patches from Microsoft).

Microsoft has not yet responded to requests for comment. However, KrebsOnSecurity has heard rumblings from several sources over the past 48 hours that this Patch Tuesday (tomorrow) will include a doozy of an update that will need to be addressed immediately by all organizations running Windows.

Will Dormann, a security researcher who authors many of the vulnerability reports for the CERT Coordination Center (CERT-CC), tweeted today that “people should perhaps pay very close attention to installing tomorrow’s Microsoft Patch Tuesday updates in a timely manner. Even more so than others. I don’t know…just call it a hunch?” Dormann declined to elaborate on that teaser.

It could be that the timing and topic here (cryptography) is nothing more than a coincidence, but KrebsOnSecurity today received a heads up from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) stating that NSA’s Director of Cybersecurity Anne Neuberger is slated to host a call on Jan. 14 with the news media that “will provide advanced notification of a current NSA cybersecurity issue.”

The NSA’s public affairs folks did not respond to requests for more information on the nature or purpose of the discussion. The invitation from the agency said only that the call “reflects NSA’s efforts to enhance dialogue with industry partners regarding its work in the cybersecurity domain.”

Stay tuned for tomorrow’s coverage of Patch Tuesday and possibly more information on this particular vulnerability.

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AndrewTerry
179 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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Build Your Own Apple I Replica with SmartyKit

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The Apple I was the original Apple computer built by Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, so naturally every Apple fanatic has dreamed of playing around with an Apple I or even having their own. But you won’t need to keep dreaming, because you’ll be able to build your own DIY Apple 1 replica thanks to ... Read More
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AndrewTerry
181 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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Apple's new privacy settings vexes trackers ↦

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George P. Slefo reports for Ad Age on how the tracking industry is reacting to Apple’s iOS 13 lockdown of apps using Bluetooth and Wi-Fi as tracking proxies. It’s a fine overview, but this is the paragraph that struck me:

The move might also strengthen the position of companies such as X-Mode, which get users’ permission to collect location data by plugging into various apps that have legitimate use cases for capturing location. The company, for example, has an earthquake alert app, making it more likely that a user would be willing to share their location. Others, such as Foursquare, gather location data through owned-and-operated consumer apps such as City Guide, Swarm and Placed.

Something to be aware of: Just because an app you’re using has a legitimate reason to track your location doesn’t mean that it won’t use that information to build a profile about you. Ad trackers will buy or build apps that have legitimate uses that require location data—and then use that data to build a profile.

With iOS 13 I find that I am being very aggressive about denying Bluetooth access and location data to most third-party apps. It’s also worth remembering only to use weather and security apps from trustworthy developers, since they’ll be getting your valuable location data.

[Hat tip: Six Colors subscriber Warren Pena.]

[Read on Six Colors.]

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AndrewTerry
277 days ago
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Brackley (UK)
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